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Abstract
The power to regulate on-board protection of merchant
vessels lies with the flag state. However, the national mod-
els of regulation are not developed in a unilateral vacuum.
In fact, the whole concept of flag state jurisdiction and legis-
lative power has to be understood and exercised on the
national level in close relation with the general regime of the
international law of the sea. The aim of the article is there-
fore two-fold: first, it aims to provide a background for the
country reports in this special issue by giving a brief insight
into the problem of piracy in the twenty-first century and
the international approaches towards this problem. Here the
article also provides an insight into the legal background by
presenting the concept of piracy in the law of the sea and
connected law enforcement powers. Thus, this part of the
article provides the overall context in which the discussions
concerning on-board protection and the development of
national regulations have occurred. Second, the article anal-
yses the issue of on-board protection from the perspective
of the legal framework in international law, as well as rele-
vant international soft-law instruments, influencing the
development on the national level. On-board protection of
vessels as such is not regulated in the international law;
however, international law provides a form of general legal
setting, in which flags states navigate. Thus, this article aims
to draw a picture of the international context in which flags
states develop their specific legal approach.
Keywords: Piracy, international law, law of the sea, on-
board protection of merchant vessels, use of force
1 Introduction
As mentioned in the introduction to this special issue,
the power to regulate on-board protection of merchant
vessels is placed on the flag state level. This does not
mean that national models of regulation are developed
in a unilateral vacuum. On the contrary, it can be argued
that the whole concept of flag state jurisdiction and leg-
islative power has always to be understood and exercised
on the national level in close relation with the general
regime of the international law of the sea and the partic-
ular system of governance set out in the UN Convention
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on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).1 Furthermore, while
the issue of on-board protection has to be – and in many
flag states is – addressed on the national level, it has also
been a topic high on the international agenda. It has
been – and still is – a subject of international discus-
sions, considerations and also of some forms of rule-
making in different international fora. Against this back-
ground, it seems rather necessary to introduce a special
issue on national models of regulation of on-board pro-
tection of merchant vessels with an international per-
spective.
The aim of this contribution is basically two-fold. First,
it aims to provide a background for the four country
reports in this special issue by giving a brief insight into
the problem of piracy in the twenty-first century and
the international approaches towards the problem. Sec-
ond, this article provides an overview on the issue of on-
board protection of merchant vessels from the perspec-
tive of the international law framework, as well as rele-
vant international soft-law instruments, influencing the
development on the national level. In this context, the
contribution also provides an insight into the legal back-
ground by presenting the concept of piracy in the inter-
national law of the sea and connected law enforcement
tools. This might not seem directly relevant in connec-
tion with the specific questions of on-board protection
by private actors; however, it is relevant as the over-all
context, in which the discussion on on-board protection
is taken. In addition, as the country reports in this spe-
cial issue illustrate, not all flag states have been initially
turning to a model of regulation which is based on the
involvement of private actors.
The international law perspective of this article raises a
number of central questions, such as the use of force
and the right to self-defence, which are at the core of the
issues at stake in connection with on-board protection.
On-board protection of vessels as such is not explicitly
regulated in the international law of the sea; however,
international law provides a kind of general legal setting
in which flag states navigate. Thus, this contribution
aims to draw an overall picture of the international con-
text in which flag states developed their specific legal
approach towards on-board protection.
1. United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (adopted on
10 December 1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994),
1833 UNTS 397.
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2 The Somali Problem of
Piracy and the Approach of
the International Community
The development of the models of regulation of on-
board protection of merchant vessels in Denmark, Ger-
many, Italy and the Netherlands is closely linked to the
development of the problem of piracy in the Horn of
Africa region at the beginning of the twenty-first centu-
ry. While piracy was never fully eradicated on the
oceans, in the legal debate of the twentieth century it
was – as mentioned in the introduction to this special
issue – primarily perceived as a historical phenomenon.2
At the start of the new millennium, piracy and other
forms of attacks against ships were, however, not neces-
sarily perceived as a historical phenomenon by seafarers.
It was a form of maritime crime occurring in different
regions of the world, such as the waters in South-East
Asia (Malacca Strait), the Caribbean and in West and
East African waters and therefore a risk to be considered
for seafarers, ship owners and insurers. Nevertheless, it
was particular the Somali problem of piracy, meaning
piracy activities launched from Somalia into the waters
of the Horn of Africa region and wider Indian Ocean
region, which put piracy on the international agenda
and, in particular, triggered the development of national
models of on-board protection of merchant vessels.
2.1 The Somali Problem of Piracy
The reasons for focusing on the East African problem of
piracy are multifaceted, but could be summed up by the
following points: first, from the early years of the mil-
lennium and up to 2010-2011, the world witnessed a
substantial increase in piracy attacks and hijackings in
the waters of the region of the Horn of Africa.3 At the
same time, the radius of operation of Somali pirates was
substantially widened. While the first attacks were regis-
tered close to certain parts of the Somali coast and in
rather limited geographical areas (mostly in the Somali-
land and Puntland coastal areas), attacks by Somali
pirates were later registered in a vast area of the Indian
Ocean. The widening of radius of operation of Somali
pirates was connected to the pirates’ use of – often
hijacked – mother ships as a base for their illegal activi-
ty. The development of the Somali problem of piracy
up to March 2010 was very illustratively visualised by
EU NAVFOR and published in an Internet article by
the BBC4:
2. See R. Geiß and A. Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea; the Legal
Framework for Counter-Piracy Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of
Aden (Oxford, 2011), 40, who are referring to the discussions under
the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.
3. See B. Feldtmann, ‘Fighting Maritime Piracy; on Possible Actions and
Consequences’, in T. Eger, Oeter & Voigt (eds.), Economic Analysis of
International Law; Contributions to the 13th Travemünde Symposium
on the Economic Analysis of Law, 29-31 March 2012 (2014) 175.
4. BBC News, 1 April 2010, ‘Kenya Ends Trials of Somali Pirates in Its
Courts’, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8599347.stm
(last visited 1 April 2019).
In addition, part of the wider context of the Somali
problem of piracy is that the increase in piracy attacks
happened in a geographical area which is quite crucial
for world trade: the passage from Asia via the Suez
Channel to Europe. It was estimated in 2005-2006,
when Somali piracy was seriously starting to present
itself as a growing problem, that about 7.5 per cent of
the world’s seaborne transportation – about 18,000 ves-
sels per year – navigated through the Suez Channel.5
The second reason for focusing on the Somali problem
of piracy is that Somalia, the state in which the pirates
were based and from which their unlawful activities
were launched, could be – at least at that time – be cate-
gorised as a ‘failed state’.6 In the context of counter pira-
cy, this means that the coastal state, which in the general
regime of the law of the sea should play a crucial role in
fighting piracy, was unable to secure its own waters,
prevent its citizens committing acts of piracy or to ini-
tiate acceptable criminal proceedings against suspected
pirates.7 Thus, Somalia was basically allowing the inter-
national community take the lead.8
Third, Somali pirates developed a specific modus oper-
andi for their criminal activity, which not only included
different forms of violence and robbery against ships but
also the long-term hijacking of vessels and kidnapping
of crews with the aim of obtaining the payment of a sub-
stantial ransom by the ship owner. Thus, Somali piracy
developed into ‘big business’, supported by well-organ-
ised criminal networks on the mainland.9
5. Berlingske, 13 September 2006, ‘Fakta: Suez-kanalens historie’, avail-
able at: https://www.berlingske.dk/videnskab/fakta-suez-kanalens-
historie (last visited 1 April 2019).
6. J.P. Pham, ‘The Failed State and Regional Dimensions of Somali Piracy’,
in B. van Ginkel and F.-P. v.d. Putten (eds.), The International Response
to Somali Piracy; Challenges and Opportunities (2010) 31 ff.
7. See Feldtmann, above n. 3, 174.
8. See further below in Section 3 on SC resolution.
9. See UNDOC, 25 May 2011, ‘Awash with Money – Organized Crime
and Its Financial Links to Somali Piracy’, available at: https://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/May/awash-with-
money---organized-crime-and-its-financial-links-to-somali-piracy.html
(last visited 1 April 2019). On the cost connect to maritime piracy see,
e.g.: Oceans Beyond Piracy, ‘The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy, 2012’
(2013), available at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/
attachments/View%20Full%20Report_3.pdf (last visited 1 April 2019).
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2.2 The International Approach towards the
Somali Problem of Piracy
The response of the international community and the
maritime stakeholder towards the Somali problem of
piracy has been multifaceted. The overall discussions
and coordination of the combined efforts against Somali
piracy take part under the auspices of the Contact Group
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS),10 which
over time has been divided into a number of (changing)
specific working groups. The CGPCS can be described
as a governance mechanism that was created to ensure
coordination of the responses to Somali piracy off the
coast of Somalia. States, international organisations,
NGOs and the industry use this forum to develop com-
mon and coordinated responses to piracy.11 The
CGPCS was created in 2009 pursuant to UNSC Reso-
lution 1851, which encourages ‘… all States and region-
al organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at
sea off the coast of Somalia to establish an international
cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of
contact between and among states, regional and interna-
tional organizations on all aspects of combating piracy
and armed robbery at sea off Somalia coast; ….’ The
CGPCS was subsequently initiated by twenty-four
states and developed over time into a strong governance
mechanism including seventy states and nineteen organ-
isations (both inter-governmental organisations and
NGOs/private organisations).12 The approaches dis-
cussed under the CGPCS and implemented under dif-
ferent schemes13 are basically based on three pillars.
First, international naval cooperation to combat piracy
and to secure a safe transfer in the Internationally Rec-
ommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of
Aden and the Indian Ocean. There have been three
major international naval operations which at least in
part had a counter-piracy mandate: Combined Task
Force (CFT 151) under the multinational naval partner-
ship Combined Maritime Force (CMF), NATO’s
Operation Ocean Shield and EU NAVFOR’s operation
Atalanta. Furthermore, a number of states, for example
India, South Korea, Russia and China, which are not
directly involved in these multinational operations, have
deployed naval vessels in the region and have been
closely working with the other stakeholders to combat
piracy.14 To enhance the cooperation and communica-
tion and to avoid conflict between the different stake-
holders an informal mechanism was established: the
10. The author has since 2013 been involved in the work under CGPCS as a
legal advisor to the legal working group (WG2 on legal issues), a partic-
ipator in the Lessons Learned Project and a member of the Danish dele-
gation.
11. See information on the GCPCS’s website, available at:
www.lessonsfrompiracy.net (last visited 1 April 2019).
12. C. Bueger, ‘Responses to Contemporary Piracy: Disentangling the
Organizational Field’, in D. Guilfoyle (ed.), Modern Piracy: Legal Chal-
lenges and Responses (2013) 98.
13. Ibid., 96-113.
14. See M. Buch, ‘Managing Pirates; Mandate, Detention and International
Aspects’, in P. Vedel Kessing and A. Laursen (eds.), Robust mandat;
juridiske udfordringer ved danske militære missioner i det 21. århun-
drede (2016) 323 ff.; B. Feldtmann, ‘Jura som et led i dansk aktivistisk
udenrigspolitik til søs’, Økonomi & Politik 2017, 1415 (2017).
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Mechanism
(SHADE) was established in 2008 to bring together
both the multinational counter-piracy operations and
states operating independently. One major tool under
SHADE is the military communication system MER-
CURY, which is a kind of ‘chat room type’ communica-
tion tool accessible for all SHADE members enabling
direct and ‘real time’ communication.15 The interna-
tional naval cooperation in the region is rather striking
in this respect, as it involves various states cooperating
and working quite closely together, allied by the aim to
combat piracy; states that in other geopolitical contexts
are not necessarily cooperating at all.
The second pillar in the effort to deal with the problem
at hand is capacity building on land. This approach is
based on the analysis that piracy is a crime which is
committed at sea, but which has its root causes on land.
Thus, a long-term, sustainable solution to Somali piracy
depends not only on repressive operations at sea but also
on long-term capacity building at land to deal with the
piracy-supporting structures and to provide alternative
occupation for the local population. It also involves the
establishment of reliable law enforcement structures
based on the rule of law on land and at sea.16
The third pillar is self-protection of the shipping indus-
try. The shipping industry and other maritime stake-
holders have developed a number of recommendations
and guidelines to prepare vessels and crews for navigat-
ing in high-risk areas and to prevent successful piracy
attacks.17 Those recommendations include, for example,
guidelines on threat assessment, navigation, training and
the ‘hardening of the vessel’. The ‘hardening’ can for
instance be archived by securing the vessel against
unwanted access with razor wire and other measures
such as water spray rails. One possible means in the
industry’s self-protection approach is the use of armed
on-board protection either by Vessel Protection Detach-
ment (VPDs) or by Privately Contracted Armed Securi-
ty Personnel (PCASPs) provided by a Private Maritime
Security Company (PMSC). The issue of on-board pro-
tection and, in particular, the use of PCASPs, is far
from uncontroversial, and guidelines usually avoid
explicitly recommending or encouraging the use of
PCASPs. The shipping industry’s Best Management
Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security
in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian
Sea, version 5 from June 2018 (BMP5) is, for example,
stating that it ‘does not recommend or endorse the gen-
eral use of PMSCs on-board merchant ships; this is a
decision taken by the individual ship operators where
15. See C. Bueger, ‘Responses to Contemporary Piracy: Disentangling the
Organizational Field’, in D. Guilfoyle (ed.), Modern Piracy: Legal Chal-
lenges and Responses (2013) 106.
16. See, e.g., the Danish Counter-piracy Strategy for the years 2011-2014:
‘Strategy for the Danish counter-piracy effort 2011-2014’, 29-39. The
Strategy is available at: http://um.dk/en/foreign-policy/piracy/ (last vis-
ited 1 April 2019).
17. See, e.g., BMP 5 (Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and
Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean
and Arabian Sea, version 5 from June 2018), which will be briefly intro-
duced below.
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permitted by the ship’s Flag State….’18 However, it can
be argued that some factors, for example, insurance pol-
icies, might in fact encourage or even prescribe the use
of PCASPs.19 The issues of on-board protection in gen-
eral and PCASPs in particular has also been on the
international agenda under the CGPCS. Real consensus
was never reached in this matter apart from the general
consensus that the issue first of all should be dealt with
at the flag state level. Nevertheless, the issue of an inter-
national legal framework for PCASPs is still occasionally
raised in international discussions.20
In conclusion, it can be argued that the combined efforts
of all of the stakeholders against Somali piracy under the
three pillars have been a general success: at the height of
Somali piracy in January 2011, 736 hostages and 32
ships were held by pirates, and by October 2016,21 no
hostages or ships were held. This could lead to the con-
clusion that the problem has been solved and no further
action is needed. This is a conclusion which is feared
and challenged by the shipping industry, which has
pointed out that the problem is not solved but has only
been effectively contained. If the efforts are terminated,
Somali piracy would most likely regain strength because
its root causes and supporting structures still exist on
the mainland. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that Somali pirates managed to hijack a vessel in March
2017 and that there has been an increase in the registra-
tion of piracy attacks in 2017 and 2018.22 Also in 2019
attacks by Somali pirates have been registered.23
It can also be argued that the positive effects of the
three-pillar approach might have an unintended side
effect with regard to on-board protection. It seems that
the states’ willingness to engage in counter-piracy oper-
ations is decreasing. Fewer vessels are deployed in the
region, and NATOs Operation Ocean Shield was termi-
nated at the end of 2016. EU NAVFOR’s operation
Atalanta has been extended to the end of 2020; however,
the naval capacity under Atalanta has been reduced
quite substantially in recent years.24 This means that the
shipping industry’s efforts are even more crucial than
before and might lead to the mind-set that on-board
protection is unavoidable.
18. BMP 5, Section 5 (Ship Protection Measures), 22.
19. The role of insurers in connection with the problem of piracy is analysed
by A. Shortland, Kidnap; Inside the Ransom Business (2019).
20. See, e.g., Final Communiqué of the 21st Plenary Session of the CGPCS
(12-13 July 2018), para. 20, available at: www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/
files/2018/07/Communique-of-the-CGPCS-21st-Plenary-Session.pdf
(last visited 1 April 2019).
21. EU NAVFOR, Operation ATALANTA, available at: https://eunavfor.eu/
mission/ (last visited 1 April 2019)
22. See Danske Rederier (Danish Ship Owners), Policy Paper ‘Piracy’,
November 2018.
23. EU NAVFOR, 24 April 2019, ‘Piracy Attack Deterred off the Coast of
Somalia’, available at: https://eunavfor.eu/piracy-attack-deterred-off-
the-coast-of-somalia/ (last visited 1 May 2019).
24. For example are currently only two naval vessels deployed under Ata-
lanta, see: EU NAVFOR, available at: https://eunavfor.eu/deployed-
units/surface-vessels/#news-tabs (last visited 1 April 2019).
3 The Concept of Piracy in
International Law and
Connected Obligations and
Powers
As mentioned in the introduction to this special issue,
piracy is by far not a new concept; not in practical terms
for seafarers or in a legal sense. Today’s perception and
codification of piracy dates back to the legal discussions
and consideration that took place at the beginning of the
twentieth century. Piracy and related obligations and
enforcement powers were first codified in the 1958 Con-
vention on the High Seas, which was based on the Har-
vard Draft Convention on Piracy of 1932. The piracy
provisions of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas
were subsequently incorporated into UNCLOS with
only minor changes.25
The starting point for today’s international approach
towards piracy is set out in Article 100, which emphasi-
ses that all states ‘… shall cooperate to the fullest possi-
ble extent in the repression of piracy …’. The concept
of piracy in international law is defined in Article 101
(‘definition of piracy’):
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
a. any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act
of depredation, committed for private ends by the
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a pri-
vate aircraft, and directed:
i. on the high seas, against another ship or air-
craft, or against persons or property on board
such ship or aircraft;
ii. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a
place outside the jurisdiction of any State;….
The definition in Article 101 entails a number of ele-
ments that are central in order to determine whether a
certain activity is piracy in the sense of international law
or not. Subsections (b) and (c) of Article 101, here not
quoted, are widening the piracy definition to certain acts
of participation, inciting or facilitating.26 The determi-
nation of an act as piracy according to Article 101 is a
precondition for states’ legitimate use of UNCLOS’
counter-piracy powers which are granted in the follow-
ing articles.27 Piracy is in Article 101 defined by a num-
ber of unlawful acts (acts of violence, detention or dep-
redation) which are carried out from one ship to another
(so-called two-ship requirement). These two criteria
have not given rise to real challenges in the context of
problem in the Horn of Africa region, as the attacks are
usually committed from small skiffs or open whalers
under the use of firearms or rocket propelled grenades
25. See Geiß and Petrig, above n. 2, 37 ff.
26. T. Treves, ‘Piracy and the International Law of the Sea’, in D. Guilfoyle
(ed.), Modern Piracy; Legal Challenges and Responses (2013) 120 f.
27. Geiß and Petrig, above n. 2, 59 ff.
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(RPGs).28 More challenging is Article 101’s require-
ment that these acts be committed ‘for private ends’.
The question at hand is, albeit slightly simplified,
whether the criterion excludes all actions that have not
exclusively an enrichment purpose but, for example, are
carried out on the basis of political/terrorist motives.
The opposite argumentation is that the criterion should
be understood as a delimitation between state-initiated
or state-sanctioned actions and actions made by private
individuals.29 The question of the interpretation of the
‘for private ends’ criterion is relevant in the context of
Somali piracy as it would be decisive for the determina-
tion of whether the international community is dealing
with piracy in UNCLOS’ sense or not if there could be
a proven connection between Somali pirate groups and
the terrorist organisation Al Shabaab. In practice, how-
ever, it is widely assumed today that Somali pirates fall
under the ‘for private ends’ criterion and the interna-
tional counter-piracy operations are based on that
assumption.30 The last central criterion in Article 101 is
that the specific acts must be committed ‘on the high
seas’ or ‘outside the jurisdiction of any state’. This
means that piracy can only be committed outside terri-
torial waters. If the same actions are committed within
territorial waters, these are typically referred to as
‘armed robbery at sea’ or similar terminology.31 Against
those acts, which are very similar to piracy but commit-
ted in territorial waters, UNCLOS’ counter-piracy
powers cannot be used. The reason for this geographical
limitation in the definition of piracy is that actions in
territorial waters in principle are subjected to the coastal
state’s jurisdiction and enforcement powers and thus
not a shared responsibility of all states.
In connection with piracy in the Horn of Africa region,
the geographical limitation of UNCLOS has to a certain
extent been evaded, since two Security Council Resolu-
tions, SC Res. 1846 (2008) and 1851 (2008), blur the
difference between piracy and ‘armed robbery at sea’ by
allowing, under specified circumstances, the possibility
of counter-piracy operations by other states both in
Somali waters and on Somali soil.32 The specific powers
granted by SC Res. 1846 (2008) and 1851 (2008) have
been time-limited, but are frequently renewed, latest
with SC Res. 2442 (2018).33
3.1 UNCLOS’ Counter-piracy Powers
The starting point for the states’ counter-piracy powers
is that there is an initial suspicion of piracy or a suspi-
cion that a given ship is a ‘pirate ship’ (Art. 103), mean-
ing it is a ship being used for piracy activities as defined
in Article 101 or is controlled by pirates. The initial
requirement for using UNCLOS’ counter-piracy pow-
ers against another ship and the persons on board is a
28. See BMP 5, 4.
29. See D. Guilfoyle, ‘Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights’,
59(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 143 (2010).
30. Feldtmann, above n. 3, 179.
31. Ibid., 178 f.
32. Geiß and Petrig, above n. 2, 70 ff.
33. Resolution 2442 (2018), para. 14, from November 2018 is granting the
powers for further thirteen months.
‘reasonable ground for suspecting’ an engagement in
piracy. If this suspicion is confirmed, UNCLOS grants
a number of specific law enforcement powers, such as
rights to visit, inspection and boarding, and the search
and seizure of items on board (Arts. 105 and 110). The
general principle here is that the enforcement powers
are extended proportionally to an increasing confirma-
tion of the suspicion. If the suspicion cannot be con-
firmed in due course, no further law enforcement
actions can be taken.34 If the suspicion is confirmed,
Article 105 grants every state the right to ‘seize a pirate
ship … and arrests the persons’. The Convention does,
however, not contain any further provisions on such
arrest; for example, the issue of legal control in connec-
tion with detention is not addressed in UNCLOS.35
UNCLOS also states that ‘The courts of the State
which carried out the seizure may decide upon the pen-
alties to be imposed…. This means that UNCLOS’
provisions include an explicit right for states to arrest
persons suspected of piracy and to initiate criminal pro-
ceedings in the state’s domestic courts. While the word-
ing in UNCLOS could indicate an exclusive right of the
seizing state, state practice indicates that the right to ini-
tiate criminal proceedings is not understood as being
exclusively granted to the seizing state and suspected
pirates have in fact been transferred between different
states on a somewhat questionable legal basis.36
While UNCLOS provides provisions on a number of
counter-piracy powers, it does not explicitly deal with
the question of the use of force in counter-piracy opera-
tions or otherwise. It is, however, argued with reference
to other international legal instruments, in particular the
nonbinding UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (UN Basic Princi-
ples),37 and to the case law of the International Tribunal
of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), in particular the M/V
Saiga Case No. 2,38 that the use of proportional force as
a last resort is implicitly permitted under UNCLOS and
therefore also permitted in the context of counter-piracy
operations.39 In relation to the question of the use of
force in counter-piracy operations, it is relevant to point
out that UNCLOS emphasises that counter-piracy
operations can only be carried out by state actors and in
particular by military entities. Article 107 provides that
34. B. Feldtmann, ‘Pirateribekæmpelse i komplekse juridiske farvande’, in
S. Bønsig, T. Elholm, S.S. Jakobsen & L.W. Lentz (eds.), I forskningens
og formidlingens tjeneste (2018) 101.
35. Ibid., 105 ff.
36. See A. Petrig, Human Rights and Law Enforcement at Sea; Arrest,
Detention and Transfer of Piracy Suspects (2014) 315 ff.
37. The UN Basic Principles are a ‘soft law instrument’, which was adopted
by consensus of 127 states in 1990, see A/CONF.144/28/Rev1 (7 Sep-
tember 1990).
38. M/V Saiga (No.2), San Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea, ITLOS
Case No. 2 (1999).
39. Geiß and Petrig, above n. 2, 69. See also D. Guilfoyle, ‘Prosecuting
Somali Pirates: A Critical Evaluation of the Options’, 10(4) Journal of
International Criminal Justice 773-4 (2012); D. Guilfoyle, ‘The Use of
Force against Pirates’, in M. Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the
Use of Force in International Law (2015) 1063 ff.
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A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out
only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or
aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on
government service and authorized to that effect.
This means that only military units, in practice mainly
navies, are granted UNCLOS’ law enforcement powers
and therefore are enabled to conduct counter-piracy
operations. In connection with the military’s role in
combating piracy it should be noted that the use of
UNCLOS’ powers against piracy happens in a law
enforcement context and not in the context of an armed
conflict. This means that it is a policing task, an issue of
crime control and that ‘the laws of war’ do not apply.40
The overall framework for a given counter-piracy oper-
ation will be further elaborated and concretised in the
specific mandate of the operation and its associated
Rules of Engagement, and further in the mandate defined
by the national parliament for its own forces.41
The fact that UNCLOS places the counter-piracy pow-
ers, and therefore indirectly also the connected right to
use proportional force, on naval entities does not
exclude the existence of an individual right of self-
defence against a piracy attack. The concept of individ-
ual self-defence raised here is not to be mixed with the
concept of the state’s right to self-defence under Article
51 of the UN Charter. The individual right of self-
defence is as a starting point based in domestic law (e.g.
in the flag states’ legislation or legal principles); thus,
certain differences in the scope and application of the
right to self-defence might occur.42 It can be assumed
that many flag states might permit the use of deadly
force in self-defence as a last response to an imminent
danger to life, but it is more questionable if states, for
example, also permit the use of deadly force to defend
property.43
The individual right to self-defence as a legal concept is
not only rooted in a given state’s national legal system
but is also accepted as a concept in international law, for
example, in Article 31(1) of the Rome Statute.44 From a
general perspective, it can be argued that the individual
right to self-defence is (indirectly) based on, or at least
closely connected to, the individual right to life. The
line of thought can be summarised as follows: Article 2
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
is protecting the right to life, both of the ‘innocent’
40. M. Buch, ‘Håndtering af pirater; mandat, frihedsberøvelse og internatio-
nale aspekter’, 330 ff. and L. Plum, ‘Håndtering af pirater; tilbagehol-
delse/frihedsberøvelse/varetægtsfængsling, retsforfølgning m.v.’, 349
ff., both in P. Vedel Kessing and A. Laursen (eds.), Robust mandat; juri-
diske udfordringer ved danske militære missioner i det 21. århundrede
(2016). See also D. Guilfoyle, ‘The Laws of War and the Fight against
Somali Piracy: Combatants or Criminals’, 11 Melbourne Journal of
International Law s. 1 ff. (2010) and C. Oehmke, Der Einsatz privater
Sicherheitsdienste auf Handelsschiffen zur Abwehr gegen Piraterie
(2016) 137-72.
41. See Buch, above n. 40, 322 ff. and Feldtmann, above n. 3, 192 ff.
42. See Oehmke, above n. 40, 184-5.
43. See Guilfoyle, above n. 39, 1067-1068.
44. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998; in force
on 1 July 2002; United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 2187, No. 38544
(last amended 2010).
citizen and the ‘wrong doer’. Article 2(II) is explicitly
stating that the taking of a life by a state representative
‘…shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of
this article when it results from the use of force which is
no more than absolutely necessary … in defence of any
person from unlawful violence’. This implies that the
protection of the individual right to life of the ‘innocent
victim’ can justify the taking of the life of the ‘wrongful
attacker’. Article 2(II) is directed at states, but it can be
argued that the provision is also indirectly implying that
there is a right to individual (personal) self-defence. It is
in this context argued that human rights law seems to
indicate that states actually may not prohibit propor-
tional individual self-defence altogether; however, the
right to life of the ‘wrong doer’ implies that states must
ensure tight, proportional boundaries to individual self-
defence rights.45
The issue of the individual right to self-defence was also
raised in the legal debate under the discussions under
the ILC in connection with Article 45, which is the
predecessor of UNCLOS’s Article 107. Under the dis-
cussions, it was emphasised that the placing of counter-
piracy powers exclusively on states, represented by mili-
tary entities, does not apply ‘in the case of a merchant
ship which has repulsed an attack by a pirate ship and,
in exercising its right of self-defence, overpowers the
pirate ship and subsequently hands it over to a war-
ship…. This is not a “seizure” within the meaning of
this article.’46 This statement is interesting for at least
two reasons; first, it confirms that the counter-piracy
powers granted to states do not exclude the exercise of
the individual right to self-defence against piracy
attacks. It is accepted that merchant ships (e.g. the per-
sons on board) have a right to self-defence and can exer-
cise this right; this is a crucial precondition for the
employment of PCASPs on merchant vessel. Second, it
places a right to a civil arrest on non-state actors exercis-
ing the right of self-defence.
3.2 SUA Convention
The counter-piracy powers under UNCLOS are sup-
plemented by other international legal acts. One legal
instrument, which is of special importance in the Horn
of Africa context is the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navi-
gation (SUA Convention).47 The SUA Convention is
not directly aimed against acts of piracy, but more gen-
erally against unlawful attacks against ships; its history
is closely linked to the Achille Lauro incident of 1985,
which highlighted some limitations of the existing regu-
latory system.48 The background of the SUA Conven-
tion is thus linked to terrorist attacks against ships and
this background is also evident from its preamble. This
45. See J.A. Hessbruegge, Human Rights Standards for Self-Defense
between Private Persons (2017).
46. ILC, ‘Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea with Commentaries’, 2 Y.B
Int’l L. Comm’n 283 (1956).
47. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), adopted 10 March 1988, 1678
U.N.T.S. 221.
48. Geiß and Petrig, above n. 2, 40.
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does not mean that the scope of the SUA Convention is
limited to terrorist activities; it is generally aimed at
unlawful acts against safe navigation. Those acts can be
acts covered by UNCLOS Article 101, but the SUA
Convention covers also other illegal acts against ships,
for example, internal attacks (e.g. attacks by passengers
on board) which would fail the two-ship requirement in
the definition of piracy in Article 101.49
One issue that has been raised in connection with the
SUA Convention’s role in combating piracy is whether
the Convention as such can be used by state actors in a
counter-piracy context. The background for this discus-
sion is that the SUA Convention in Article 2 states that
the Convention does not apply to warships and other
state-owned ships. It is, however, argued that this
restriction is aimed at the group of vessels that the Con-
vention is seeking to protect and which are the potential
targets of the Convention’s considered forms of unlaw-
ful attacks.50 In other words, the SUA Convention aims
to protect civilian ships – not state ships. The law
enforcement obligations and powers provided for in the
SUA Convention are in contrast targeted at states and
will in practice be used by state actors, including war-
ships and other state ships. The practices of states in the
Horn of Africa region illustrate that the SUA Conven-
tion is considered by many states as a supplement to the
counter-piracy powers under the UNCLOS regime, for
example, in connection with the handling of suspected
pirates.51 It can, however, be questioned whether the
SUA Convention adds anything to UNCLOS’ enforce-
ment powers, since the SUA Convention does not con-
tain more specific law enforcement powers such as the
stopping and boarding of foreign ships.52 On the other
hand, state practices seem to indicate that states/state
authorities explicitly invoke the provisions in the SUA
Convention when dealing with piracy cases, for exam-
ple, in connection with the transfer of suspected
pirates.53
Furthermore, the SUA Convention places a number of
obligations on states; for example, Article 5 of the Con-
vention requires that states criminalise a number of
actions that are further defined in Article 3. Those
actions, which each state has to criminalise in its own
domestic legal system, include various forms of attacks
against ships or their crews or passengers. These actions
can be piracy but also other illegal acts outside the scope
of the definition of piracy in Article 101 in UNCLOS.
The illegal acts concerned include also acts committed
in territorial waters if the affected ship has sailed, or
intends to sail, in or out of a given state’s territorial
49. D. Guilfoyle, ‘Treaty Jurisdiction over Pirates: A Compilation of Legal
Texts with Introductory Notes’, report prepared for Contact Group on
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 26-27 August 2009 (New York: Con-
tact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 2009), 12.
50. See Guilfoyle, above n. 29, 149; Petrig, above n. 36, 44.
51. See A. Petrig, above n. 36, 235, on Art. 7 of the SUA Convention as a
legal basis for detention.
52. See M. Frostad, Voldelige Hav; Pirateri og Jus (2016) 120 f.
53. See A. Petrig, above n. 36, 43-47, who herself is concluding that states
cannot use Art. 8 of the SUA Convention as a basis for a delivery/trans-
fer.
waters (Art. 4). States are obliged not only to criminalise
these actions but also to have criminal jurisdiction in a
number of specified situations.54
The SUA Convention, as mentioned above, does not
directly grant states specific law enforcement powers to
arrest suspected perpetrators with the exception of Arti-
cle 7(2) which obligates states ‘…, in accordance with its
law, take him into custody or take other measures to
ensure his presence for such time as is necessary to ena-
ble any criminal or extradition proceedings to be institu-
ted’, if another state issues an arrest warrant. The proce-
dure for such detention must be in accordance with the
national law of that state. The overall aim of the SUA
convention is that there are no safe havens for potential
perpetrators. This has led to a legal debate on whether
the SUA Convention in combination with the counter-
piracy provisions of UNCLOS might in fact obligate
states to initiate criminal proceedings against suspected
pirates in their own domestic courts. One line of argu-
mentation is that the SUA Convention contains an aut
dedere – aut iudicare clause which in its sum means that
there is an obligation of the state of apprehension to
prosecute at least if no other state is prosecuting.55
Another line of argumentation is that it is questionable
whether the SUA Convention is in fact establishing a
general obligation to prosecute or only an obligation to
prosecute or extradite if there is an extradition request
by another state. Furthermore, it is argued that the pro-
visions of the SUA Convention are not covering the
specific situation of counter piracy and that UNCLOS’
provisions (even in combination with the provisions of
the SUA Convention) are not establishing an obligation
to prosecute. The central argument here is that
UNCLOS’ Article 105 is using the term ‘may’ in con-
nection with the seizing state’s right to initiate criminal
proceedings.56 State practice in the Horn of Africa
region indicates that states do not necessarily accept the
idea of a general obligation to prosecute suspected
pirates. Thus, there are several examples of a ‘catch and
release’ approach where suspected pirates were released
without any further consequences. This can be illustra-
ted by the Danish example: Danish naval forces have
seized 295 persons under the suspicion of piracy, and
only 50 of those were transferred to prosecution.57 At
the same time has the establishment of a system for the
prosecution of suspected pirates been a central part in
the efforts under the CGPCS and resulted in what can
be called ‘chain of criminal justice’ where one state
might arrest the suspected pirates and transfers them to
another state which is hosting the criminal proceedings.
If convicted, the pirates get transferred to serve their
sentence in Somalia.58
The SUA Convention does not explicitly deal with pos-
sible powers of private actors. However, the Convention
54. See Feldtmann, above n. 34, 103.
55. Geiß and Petrig, above n. 2, 163 f.
56. On this discussion, see Geiß and Petrig, above n. 2, 163 f.; Guilfoyle,
above n. 49, 14 ff.; Feldtmann, above n. 3, 181 f. and 187 ff.
57. See Feldtmann, above n. 14, 16 ff.
58. Ibid., 20.
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indicates indirectly the master’s right to make a civil
arrest in connection with attacks against his vessel since
Article 8(1) provides the master with a right to hand
over any person suspected of having carried out an
attack on board or against his ship to any state. This
must of course mean that the master can withhold the
person on board until they can be handed over in due
course. The SUA convention does not deal with the
issue of the use of force or the right to self-defence;
however, the above-mentioned principles are also
applied in the context of the SUA Convention.
3.3 Summing Up
From the perspective of PCASPs it might not be of par-
ticular relevance whether a violent attack against the
vessel falls under UNCLOS definition of piracy or not.
Private actors are not granted any specific law enforce-
ment powers under UNCLOS, and it is rather ques-
tionable if they indeed would be interested in such pow-
ers if those were an option. From a PCASP perspective
the question of the right to self-defence as a basis for the
PCASPs function on board is the central issue at stake.
The conclusion from an international law perspective is
that an individual’s right to self-defence is generally
accepted and that the particularities of such a right are
determined by domestic legislation or principles. This
approach might seem attractive from a domestic flag
state perspective and fit fine with the general idea of
exclusive flag state jurisdiction in UNCLOS Article
94(1). On the other hand, such a national approach
towards the issue at hand has certain inherent risks;
national concepts of self-defence vary, for example, in
relation to the exact point in time when the right is trig-
gered or to the question of whether the right is only
triggered by attacks against human life or also by attacks
against property. This means that an act which is a
legitimate act of self-defence in one legal system is not
necessarily (yet) covered by the concept of self-defence
in another system. This means that PCASPs are exercis-
ing their task on board with some legal uncertainty and
could in a worst-case scenario face criminal proceedings
in the flag state of the vessel where the intended act of
self-defence was aimed at or in the state where the
attackers came from.
From a broader perspective of on-board protection of
merchant vessels, the question of the definition of piracy
in UNCLOS is rather crucial. If the on-board protec-
tion is carried out by a VPD model, the task of protect-
ing a specific vessel might be combined with certain law
enforcement elements which can only be exercised by
state representatives. The individual’s right to self-
defence and the state’s right of the use of force in coun-
ter piracy are not necessarily identical. Thus, the choice
of approach on the national level has implications on the
question of whether the employment of on-board pro-
tection on merchant vessels is only with a view to a spe-
cific protective task under the domestic right of self-
defence or could be also seen in the wider context of the
state’s approaches and powers under counter piracy and
law enforcement.
4 The Issue of On-board
Protection, VPDs and
PCASPs in International Law
The issue of on-board protection of merchant vessels by
VPDs or PCASPs is, as mentioned earlier, not directly
addressed in UNCLOS or directly regulated in other
sources of international law. It can of course be consid-
ered whether the general counter-piracy powers under
UNCLOS (and under other international laws) might
influence the role of VPDs on merchant vessels. In this
context, it is important to remember that the right to
seizure under UNCLOS, as briefly raised previously,
may only be enforced ‘by warships or military aircraft,
or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable
as being on government service and authorized to that
effect’ (Art. 107). This implies that if a flag state wishes
to use the VPD model and seeks to combine the protec-
tion of a specific vessel with a more proactive counter-
piracy approach, it might be necessary to formally put
the vessel under government service and mark it accord-
ingly. However, if the setting is not a proactive law
enforcement approach it could be argued that in a
responsive situation, where the pirates attack and are
repelled by the VPDs, the VPDs subsequently can
arrest the perpetrators and use the powers under
UNCLOS even if the vessel was not in government
service and marked accordingly.59
Another crucial question in connection with the use of
VPDs is whether the government personnel on board
the merchant vessel can benefit from the immunities
connected to warships and government vessels under
Articles 95 and 96. In this context, it has been pointed
out that in a case of alleged wrongful death of a person
mistakenly identified as a pirate, the state embarking the
VPDs on the private vessel will be held responsible
under state responsibility. Furthermore, while it could
be argued for the immunity of the particular guard as a
state agent, domestic courts are not necessarily follow-
ing that line of thought. In the Enrica Lexie incident
from 2012, Italian VPDs employed on an Italian mer-
chant vessel shot dead two Indian fishermen who were
mistaken for being pirates. The two Italian officers
involved in the incident were brought in front of an
Indian court, which denied their claim of immunity.60
For states which choose to opt for a PCASP model
instead of a VPD model, international law has little spe-
cific guidance to offer. The law of the sea and in partic-
ular UNCLOS is not addressing the topic as such, and
the international community could neither achieve any
real common ground on the issues at stake in the discus-
59. See D. Guilfoyle, ‘Commentary on UNCLOS Article 107’, in A. Proelss
(ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A
Commentary (2017) 758-9.
60. See Y. Tanaka, ‘Dual Provisional Measures Prescribed by ITLOS and
Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal: Reflections on the “Enrica Lexie” Incident
Case’, The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and
Jurisprudence (2017) 265 ff.
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sion under the CGPCS or anywhere else. This means
that international law provides only a general legal back-
ground for flag state regulation, but no specific guide-
lines for the domestic regulation of PCASPs and their
employment on board. As a result of this gap in the reg-
ulation on the international level, a body of soft-law
instruments and self-regulation by the industry has been
developed to address the issues at stake and to supple-
ment flag state regulation. Those instruments include,
for example, four specific IMO interim recommenda-
tions on PCASPs addressed to flag states, coastal/port
states, ship owners and security companies and drafted
by IMO’s Maritime Security Committee (MSC).61
Another example is the above-mentioned BMP5 drafted
by the shipping industry.62 BMP5 is not dealing primar-
ily with the issue of PCASP as such but is providing
more general recommendations ‘… to help ships plan
their voyage and to detect, avoid, deter, delay and report
attacks’.63 BMP5 is as a starting point a nonbinding self-
regulatory guidance by the shipping industry to private
actors; however, as some of the country reports in this
special issue indicate, BMP5 has a strong influence on
national regulation, and it can even be argued that some
flag states implement BMP5 in their own regulation and
thereby transform nonbinding industry self-regulation
into binding national legislation. This is for example the
case in Denmark, where a ministerial order64 is prescrib-
ing in its § 8 that ships have to develop their counter-
piracy security procedures in the light of the recommen-
dations of the BMP (in its most recent version). What is
even more interesting is that the ministerial order in its
§ 13 criminalises the situation where a ship owner/oper-
ator is not following the obligations set out in the minis-
terial order. This could mean in its consequence that a
ship owner could get punished if he is not implementing
the recommendations of the BMP in the ship’s security
procedures.
In the context of nonbinding instruments and self-regu-
lation two more instruments should be briefly men-
tioned: first, the world’s leading shipping association
61. MSC.1/Circ.1443; IMO Maritime Safety Committee, ‘Revised Interim
Recommendations for Flag States regarding the Use of Privately Con-
tracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area’
(12 June 2015) MSC.1/Circ.1406/Rev.3; IMO Maritime Safety Com-
mittee, ‘Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States regarding
the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board
Ships in the High Risk Area’ (16 September 2011) MSC.1/Circ.1408;
IMO Maritime Safety Committee, ‘Revised Interim Recommendations
for Port and Coastal States regarding the Use of Privately Contracted
Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area’ (25
May 2012) MSC.1/Circ.1408/Rev.1; IMO Maritime Safety Committee,
‘Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmas-
ters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on
Board Ships in the High Risk Area’ (25 May 2012) MSC.1/Circ.1405/
Rev.2.
62. Best Management Practice to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime
Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea
from June 2018 (BMP5) replacing Best Management Practice for Pro-
tection against Somalia Based Piracy from August 2011 (BMP4).
63. BMP5, 1.
64. Bekendtgørelse om teknisk forskrift om forholdsregler til forebyggelse af
pirateri og væbnede overfald på danske skibe, bek. 1084/2011
(23 November 2011).
Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) has
developed a standard contract for the employment of
security guards on vessels, the so-called GUARD-
CON.65 GUARDCON seeks to regulate the contractual
relationship between the ship owner and the security
provider; however, GUARDCON also affects areas of
public law, for example, by dealing with the relationship
between the master and the team leader of the
PCASP.66 Second, the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) has developed a standard for the
accreditation of Private Maritime Security Companies
(PMSCs).67
The lack of specific regulation of PCASPs and connec-
ted questions in international law combined with the
development of soft-law and self-regulation instruments
leads to the conclusion that the topic of PCASPs is com-
plex and leads to certain legal uncertainties. IMO’s
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) noted in connection
with their recommendations that the absence of applica-
ble regulation and industry self-regulation coupled with
complex legal requirements gives cause for concern.68
While international law is not specifically addressing
PCASP, it still provides the general framework for the
governance of the oceans and for the regulation on the
flag state level. This means that international law is
highly relevant in connection with a number of issues
which are linked to the use of PCASP, some of these
will be briefly raised in the following subsections.
4.1 Weapons On-board and the Issue of Innocent
Passage
One central issue which has been raised in particular
with the question of PCASP, but to a certain extent is
also relevant in a VPD context, is the question of
whether the fact that a merchant vessel has weapons on
board influences its right to innocent passage through a
given coastal states’ territorial waters. The right to inno-
cent passage is one of the central elements in the balance
between the coastal states interest to rule and govern its
own territorial waters and flag states’ interest of free
navigation without any interference.69 The right to
innocent passage is codified in Article 17 and basically
limits a coastal state’s jurisdiction on vessels passing
thought its territorial waters. Article 18 clarifies passage
by stating it ‘means navigation through the territorial
sea for the purpose of … traversing that sea without
65. Baltic and International Maritime Council’s standard contract for the
employment of security guards on vessels (GUARDCON). See BIMCO’s
webpage, available at: https://www.bimco.org/ (last visited 1 April
2019).
66. GUARDCON, Part II, cl. 8.
67. ISO 28007-1:2015 Ships and Marine Technology – Guidelines for Pri-
vate Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) Providing Privately Contrac-
ted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) on Board Ships (and Proforma
Contract), ISO 28007.
68. IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), ‘Revised Interim Guidance to
Private Maritime Security Companies Providing Privately Contracted
Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area’
(25 May 2012) MSC.1/Circ.1443, Annex (1).
69. See K. Siig and B. Feldtmann, ‘UNCLOS as a System of Regulation and
Connected Methodology: Some Reflections’, 502 SIMPLY (MarIus)
74 f. (2018).
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entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port
facility outside internal waters; or … proceeding to or
from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port
facility…. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious.’
This means that, for example, a vessel on a journey
through the Red Sea passing through a given state’s ter-
ritorial waters would be on a passage according to Arti-
cle 18. The second criterion is that the passage must be
innocent. According to Article 19(1) a passage is inno-
cent ‘so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State.’ This is more
specified in the following Subsection (2), which lists a
number of activities which result in that the passage
should be considered as not innocent. In the context of
armed on-board protection litra (a) and (b) are relevant
in particular. Litra (a) excludes ‘any threat or use of
force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the coastal State, or in any
other manner in violation of the principles of interna-
tional law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations’ from the concept of innocent, while litra (b)
deals with ‘any exercise or practice with weapons of any
kind’. This could lead to the conclusion that a passage is
not innocent if weapons are on board; this would be a
hasty conclusion. It is argued in the legal debate that
Article 19 describes certain activities which are prejudi-
cial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
state. The carriage of safely stored weapons on a voyage
is not in itself a threat or an activity in the sense of Arti-
cle 19(2) and could, for example, be compared to the
carrying of dangerous cargo, which in itself does not
contradict innocent passage. It is therefore not convinc-
ing to conclude that weapons on board in itself would
contradict innocent passage.70 Things get more compli-
cated if the weapons are actually used, even in self-
defence, and it is argued that the wide wording of Arti-
cle 19(2) litra (b) referring to ‘any exercise or practice
with weapons’ indicates that the use of weapons for
whatever reason interferes with the concept of innocent
passage.71 And even if the use of weapons in self-
defence would not interfere with the concept of inno-
cent passage, it could still trigger the right of the coastal
state to investigate the incident and exercise criminal
jurisdiction under Article 27(1)(a) or (b).
In addition, the foregoing conclusions and considera-
tions are not unopposed: the reality in the Horn of Afri-
ca region indicates, for example, that some coastal states
draw a different legal conclusion and perceive safely
stored weapons on board as incompatible with the con-
cept of innocent passage with the consequence that they
reserve the option of law enforcement against vessels
passaging with weapons on board.72 The legal uncer-
tainties in connection with the carriage of weapons and
the concept of innocent passage is most likely a factor in
the development of so-called floating armouries, which
70. Oehmke, above n. 40, 226-30.
71. Ibid., 230-3.
72. This conclusion was supported by a Danish questionnaire-based study
conducted by the University of Southern Denmark. The results of this
study are with the author.
briefly described are commercial vessels placed out of
territorial waters and functioning as a kind of sea-based
weapon and equipment storage facility. The establish-
ment of floating armouries is not uncontroversial; some
states in the Indian Ocean region perceive them as a
protentional threat to security in the region. Floating
armouries lead to a number of legal concerns and legal
challenges; they are not explicitly regulated in interna-
tional law and in fact subject to the general regulation of
vessels and the regulation by the flag state and the state
where the company is registered.73 Nevertheless, today
they are part of the reality in the wider Indian Ocean
region.74 It is therefore interesting to see whether the
flag states’ models of regulation of on-board protection
presented in this special issue address the question of
how to get weapons transported and on-board or not or
even might prohibit the use of the services of floating
armouries.
4.2 The Issue of the Role of the Master and the
Team Leader
A very crucial, but also somewhat complicated, issue in
connection with the employment of PCASPs (and to a
far lesser extent of VPDs) is the role of the master and
the division of powers between the master and the team
leader. The problem in a nutshell can be summarised by
the question of who has the final say in issuing the
weapons and ordering the end of the self-defence. The
starting point for the legal considerations is the general
status and role of the master in the law of the sea. The
master is the final authority on board. In addition, some
flag states might understand the master, under certain
circumstances, as a formal representative of the state. A
central element in the master’s function is to ensure the
safety of the vessel and all persons on board. This is, for
example, emphasised in the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Regulation 34.1:
neither the owner, the charterer, the operating company
nor any other person can prevent or restrict decisions
taken by the master with view to the safety of life at sea.
The dangers of a piracy attack are an issue of the safety
of life at sea and therefore under Regulation 34.1. On
the other hand, it can be argued that the master does not
have the necessary training and tactical knowledge in
this arena; this is the qualification the team leader and
his personnel should add. Furthermore, the right to
self-defence is an individual right and cannot be easily
overruled by a master.75
These here only briefly raised aspects illustrate that the
employment of PCASP creates a certain overlap or clash
of competences and powers. The shipping industry and
73. Floating armouries and connected legal questions are a topic several
times raised under the discussion of the CGPCS, see, e.g., Final Com-
muniqué of the 21st Plenary Session of the CGPCS (12-13 July 2018),
para. 20, available at: www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2018/07/
Communique-of-the-CGPCS-21st-Plenary-Session.pdf (last visited
1 April 2019).
74. A. Wilpon, ‘Floating Armories: A Legal Grey Area in Arms Trade and the
Law of the Sea’, 48 Georgetown Journal of International Law 873 ff.
(2016).
75. See Oehmke, above n. 40, 201-6.
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other maritime stakeholders have tried to deal with the
problems at hand by issuing guidelines and thereby try-
ing to provide for a functioning division between the
role of the master and the team leader. One example is
BIMCO’s widely used standard contract GUARD-
CON, which in Clause 8 on the one hand tries to con-
firm the authority of the master and on the other hand
puts the decision of the use of force on the team leader
while the master keeps the overruling right to end the
self-defence.76 It is not certain that GUARDCON’s
model will solve all possible conflicts, but the example
shows that the maritime stakeholders seek to create their
own regulation if the law is of little guidance. It is inter-
esting to see in the following country reports in this spe-
cial issue if the issue of division of powers between the
master and the team leader is explicitly dealt with on the
national level.
The question of division of powers is linked to another
question which could be raised on the national level.
Who is held responsible if things go wrong? If, for
example, a master after consulting the team leader issues
the weapons and a PCASP wrongly shoots an innocent
fisherman, could the master be criminally liable as an
associate to the crime? The answer towards that ques-
tion has ultimately to be answered on the level of
national criminal law (e.g., of the flag state or the state of
the victim) and depends on the concept of participation
in a crime. In general, it can be assumed that it seems
possible, of course depending on the specific circum-
stances of a given case, that a master can be liable as an
associate to a crime committed by a PCASP if he is
involved in the wrongful decision to open fire.
4.3 The Duty to Render Assistance and the
Protection of Vessels
One of the deeply rooted principles of the law of the sea,
which today is codified in a number of different legal
acts, is the duty to render assistance. The duty is, for
example, codified in UNCLOS Article 98 and SOLAS
Regulation 33. The specific wording of the codification
in the different legal acts varies; the wording in SOLAS
seems, for example, to indicate a direct obligation of the
master while the provision in UNCLOS puts the obli-
gation on the flag state which subsequently has to
ensure that the master is following the duty.77 Beyond
those differences, all codifications have some shared
core elements. One of those elements is that the duty to
render assistance is triggered by a distress situation, in
particular where lives are at risk. The crucial question
here is if there is a distress situation where the safety of
the vessel and its crew is at peril and not why this situa-
tion has occurred. Another of these core elements is the
principle of own safety first. The duty to render assis-
tance is limited by (or preconditioned by) the safety of
the rescuer’s own vessel and crew.
76. Ibid., 205-6.
77. See B. Feldtmann, ‘What Happens After the Defense? Considering
“Post Incident” Obligations of Masters from the Perspective of Interna-
tional and Danish Law’, 46 Ocean Development & International Law
(ODIL) 98 ff. (2015); Oehmke, above n. 40, 206 ff.
In the context of on-board protection, the duty to ren-
der assistance might be relevant in two situations. First,
a duty to render assistance can be triggered if a vessel
has employed PCASPs or VPDs and gets a distressed
call from another vessel under attack. It is argued that
the specific duty would be here to get to the vessel
under attack and assist by using the weapons to repel
the attacker.78 Second, the duty to render assistance
comes into play if the PCASPs or VPDs have repelled
an attack and the attackers are seriously harmed or their
vessel is unable to navigate or is sinking.79
When considering the duty to render assistance it must
be kept in mind that the duty, as mentioned earlier, is
limited by the principle of own safety first. This means
that the master has a certain room for assessing the spe-
cific situation at hand and the inherent risks. This
means also that the master must not necessarily pick up
the same persons who attacked his vessel only a few
minutes ago. However, the master must be aware of the
duty and take it into account.80 If not, he bears the risk
of criminal prosecution before domestic courts.
In connection with possible obligations after a repelled
attack another question might come into play. Are the
PCASPs or the VPDs obliged to try to arrest the perpe-
trators? As shown earlier, state representatives have
under certain circumstances law enforcement powers
against suspected pirates. It is, however, from an inter-
national law perspective questionable if those powers
can be understood as an actual obligation. Also,
PCASPs have, as mentioned earlier, the right to per-
form a civil arrest with a view to handing the perpetra-
tors over to the authorities. This is a right but not an
obligation. If PCASPs or VPDs do in fact arrest suspec-
ted pirates a number of connected issues arise, such as
their treatment on board and other human rights issues.
4.4 Summing Up
The international law of the sea does not directly deal
with the issue of armed on-board protection of mer-
chant vessels; it is neither encouraging nor prohibiting
such approaches. Flag states that wish to regulate the
issues at hand receive only limited guidance from the
law of the sea; it is merely functioning as a general legal
framework, when PCASPs or VPDs are employed. The
employment of armed guards leads to complex and
diverse legal questions and one of the conclusions in the
light of the above brief considerations is that it seems
that soft-law instruments play a crucial role in the
attempt to clarify the issues at stake and to operational-
ise the general rules and principles.
78. See D. König and T. Salomon, ‘Private Sicherheitsdienste auf Handels-
schiffen; Rechtliche Implikationen’, 2 PiraT-Arbeitspapire zur Maritimen
Sicherheit (2011).
79. Feldtmann, above n. 77, 98 ff.
80. Ibid., 103 ff.
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5 Concluding Remarks
The issue of armed on-board protection of merchant
vessels is not an easy one, neither in the public debate
nor from a legal perspective. PCASP and VPD are, as
the country reports in this special issue illustrate, topics
which lead to diverse approaches and models of regula-
tion. International law is not providing much guidance
on the issues at stake; it neither explicitly prohibits nor
actively supports the use of armed on-board protection
and seems to express no specific preference for either
the PCASP or VPD model. The task of on-board pro-
tection of specific merchant vessels is as such not part of
the counter-piracy powers under UNCLOS, and the
legal status of different types of guards give rise to a
number of legal concerns. The PCASP and the VPD
models have from an international law perspective some
shared legal challenges to face, as well as challenges
more specifically relevant for one or the other model.
One of the conclusions which can be drawn from the
international perspective is that the use of on-board pro-
tection give rise to certain legal uncertainties; some of
those are connected to the fact that coastal states (or
other flag states) might exercise an interpretation of
international law which could be questionable but nev-
ertheless could have an impact on the guards employed
on foreign vessels. This means that every flag state and
every ship owner must reflect on the issues at stake and
the connected legal risks and on this basis choose the
way to proceed.
One consideration that from an international perspec-
tive could be raised is that the lack of international regu-
lation of on-board protection, the right of self-defence
and the connected security marked could lead to a ‘race
to the bottom’, meaning that certain flag states, for
example, flag states which could be perceived as ‘flags of
convenience’81 with little interest in and control of their
ship register and the actual conditions on board, could
give way to a situation where there is no control with
armed protection and no legal guidance for the use of
weapons on board. It can be argued that a part of the
shipping industry, which perceives themselves as
‘responsible quality shipping’, could in this sense have
an interest in at least some binding minimum standards
for all PCASPs and thereby avoid unfair competition
from the ‘race to the bottom’.
Another conclusion of the international law perspective
is that a lack of formal, binding international regulation
in the field gives way to a soft-law approach, meaning
nonbinding attempts of regulation in different fora.
This can be perceived as a smooth and flexible way to
deal with the problem at hand; the other side of the
medal is, however, that the problem is not necessarily
solved. Nonbinding regulation might work well if it is
widely accepted and implemented; if it is not followed
in real life, it could be argued that it functions more as a
kind of alibi. One possible way to strengthen the impact
81. Guilfoyle, above n. 59, 694.
of nonbinding international rules and guidelines would
be where states decide to implement soft-law principles
or rules in their own legislation; the country reports in
this special issue are casting some light on the question
of whether this is the case or not.
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